Abductive Reasoning: From Peirce's Philosophical Foundations to Walton's Dialogic Argumentation

Document Type : Original Article

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English Language Teacher - Ministry of Education

Abstract

This paper examines abductive reasoning, tracing its philosophical origins in the work of Charles Peirce and its subsequent development, with a particular focus on the contributions of Douglas Walton, especially his work on argumentation schemes. It explores the nature of abduction, its position within broader frameworks of reasoning, and the foundational principles established by Peirce. The paper also investigates how philosophers have expanded upon this concept post-Peirce, addressing the challenges associated with its interpretation, translation, and application across science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning.
The study situates abduction within Peirce’s tripartite classification of inference—deduction, induction, and abduction—emphasizing its role in hypothesis generation and the non-deductive explanation of phenomena. Furthermore, it traces the evolution of abduction from Peirce’s original formulation to contemporary perspectives that conceptualize it as inference to the best explanation. Drawing on recent philosophical and interdisciplinary research, the paper examines abduction as a dynamic and adaptable process that relies on informed conjecture and logical dialogue. It also highlights the practical implications of abduction in both scientific inquiry and everyday contexts, specifically noting Walton's development of argumentation schemes that refine our understanding of reasoning.
 

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Journal of the Faculty of Arts
Volume 85, Issue 5 - Serial Number 5
July 2025 Social Sciences Issue
July 2025
Pages 1-30

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